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STATE OF NEW YORK. 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2A-9/26/75 
In t h e M a t t e r of 
COUNTY OF NASSAU, 
-and-
Respondent, 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
e-AS-E-NO-r-U-101-5-
NASSAU CHAPTER, CIVIL SERVICE EMPLOYEES 
AS-SOG-I-A-TTeN-,--FNe. y-
Charging Party. 
This case comes to us on the exceptions of the Nassau Chapter 
of CSEA (CSEA) to the decision of a hearing officer dismissing its 
charge on the ground that it was not timely. The charge, as 
amended, had alleged that the County of Nassau (County) had 
violated CSL §209-a.l(a) and (d) in that it had unilaterally altered 
terms and conditions of employment by promulgating a policy that 
required newly hired auto mechanics employed in its Police Depart-
ment to furnish their own hand tools and to sign a statement prior 
to employment to that effect. Almost all of the evidence in this 
1 
case was included in a stipulation. 
It is clear that in November 19 72, the County unilaterally 
terminated a long-standing past practice of furnishing, without 
charge, all hand tools to auto mechanics employed in its Police 
Department, and established a new policy requiring all employees 
hired thereafter to furnish their own hand tools as a condition of 
hiring. This new policy has been in effect since that time and 
was known to some employees in the negotiating unit that included 
1 CSEA called one witness who testified briefly regarding the 
type and cost of equipment that the candidates for emp:5M|m^t 
were required to purchase. 
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the auto mechanics and was represented by CSEA. 
The charge was filed on November 2, 1973, about a year after 
the unilateral action was taken by the County. There is no 
evidence before us regarding the date when CSEA first became aware 
of the County's unilateral change and CSEA's attorney made an 
unsworn statement that it first became aware of the situation 
shortly before September 18, 1973. This issue of timeliness was 
not raised by the County, but the hearing officer, noting that it 
is jurisdictional, raised it himself. Concluding that CSEA had 
the burden of submitting evidence establishing the date when it 
first became aware of the circumstances that it alleges constituted 
the violation, and finding that CSEA failed to do so, he dismissed 
the charge. 
There are unique circumstances in this case including: the 
absence of any substantial record of the facts; the unsworn 
representation by CSEA's attorney that CSEA first became aware of 
the facts shortly before September 18; and, the absence of any 
challenge by the County to this representation. It may be that 
under these circumstances the hearing officer should have assumed 
the timeliness of the charge, rather than raising the question on 
his own. However, assuming arguendo that this were true, we would, 
nevertheless, affirm his decision and would dismiss the charge. 
In our opinion, the unilateral change instituted by the 
County did not involve a term and condition of employment in that 
it applied only to candidates for employment. In a related case, 
we dealt with the circumstances of an employer, the Board of 
Education of the City School District of Rochester, imposing a 
requirement that certain candidates for employment must live within 
the City of Rochester. The hearing officer ruled (The Association 
of Central Office Administrators, 4 PERB 4597, 4599): 3 9 5 9 
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"[I]t is readily apparent that the decision 
to impose a residency requirement is not a 
mandatory subject of negotiations. A 
residency requirement is not a condition of, 
but a qualification for, employment.... 
Traditionally, qualifications for employment 
have been matters of managerial prerogative...." 
(emphasis in original) 
This opinion was affirmed by us at 4 PERB 3703. 
The requirement unilaterally imposed by the County that 
p_ersons"TiiredJ" as ""'auto ""mechanics" "in "its- Police Department have their 
own hand tools, was also a qualification for employment. 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the charge herein be, and 
hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: September 26, 19 75 
Albany, New York / 
Robert D. Helsby, Chairman 
DISSENT 
I dissent. I do not regard the possession of hand tools as 
a qualification for employment, but as a condition of employment. 
•e 
Jo'sepn R. Crowley 
Dated: September 26, 1975 
Albany, New York 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
STATE OF NEW YORK, 
Respondent 
and 
UNITED UNIVERSITY PROFESSIONS, INC., 
LOCAL 2190, AFT JAFL-CIO), 
Charging Party. 
#2B-9/26/75 
BOARD DECISION 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1445 
This matter comes to us on exceptions filed by the United 
University Professions, Inc., Local 2190, AFT (AFL-CIO) (charging 
party) to a decision of a hearing officer dismissing its charge on 
the ground that it was untimely— The charge, filed on January 17, 
1975, had alleged that the State of New York (respondent) had 
violated CSL §§209-a.1(a), (c) and (d). The factual allegations 
(underlying the charge are that: 
1. On May 7, 19 74, the charging party and the respondent 
reached an agreement for the period July 1, 1974 through June 30, 
JL976. 
2. Sometime thereafter, the respondent's Office of Employee 
Relations "did deliberately and wrongfully represent to the legisla-
ive body of the State of New York inaccurate information respecting 
1 Although not specified in its exceptions, the charging party 
argues in its brief that the hearing officer showed partiality in 
favor of respondent. He further argued that the hearing officer 
should have been disqualified because Counsel to respondent had 
been previously employed by PERB and had been a colleague of the 
hearing officer. Having scrutinized the record, we find no 
evidence of partiality. We also reject the position that it is 
inherently improper for a case to be presented by a, former 
employee of the Board and heard by a former colleague of his who 
is still employed by this Board. (See Matter of State of New 
York, 6 PERB 3131 [1973] and Rules of Procedure §208.2). 
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the negotiated compensation for certain members of the bargaining 
unit, to wit: '...that such increase shall not be applicable to 
incumbents of part time positions established on an individual 
basis for teaching in evening or extension programs.'" 
3. "[T]he Legislature pro forma on the recommendations of the 
Office of Employee Relations and on or about the 16th of May, 1974, 
enacted legislation in accordance with said recommendation." 
(emphasis in original) 
4. The impact of such legislation was that certain employees 
in the negotiating unit were deprived of rights that had been 
obtained through collective negotiations. 
The charging party concludes that the respondent, through its 
Dffice of Employee Relations, violated CSL §209-a.l(a), (c) and (d) 
by unilaterally changing terms and conditions of employment. It is 
a matter of record that the subject bill was submitted to the 
Legislature on May 7, 1974, and that the charging party knew of the 
circumstances constituting the alleged violation by the 14th of 
August 1974. Relying upon this, the hearing officer determined 
2 
that the charge was not timely. The charging party argued the 
irrelevancy of the August 14, 1974 date and offered to prove that 
the wrong was first suffered on October 1, 1974 when the negotiated 
increase should have been, but was not paid. The hearing officer 
rejected the charging party's position. 
We confirm the hearing officer's decision. No wrong transpire 
on October 1, 1974 when respondent failed to pay an increase as 
2 PERB's Rules of Procedure§§204.1(a)(1) does not permit the 
consideration of an improper practice charge that complains 
about conduct which occurred more than four months prior., to^ 
the filing of the charge. 0^0. 
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there was no contractual obligation to do so. CSL §§201.12 and 
204-a make it clear that to the extent that an agreement requires 
legislative action to provide additional funds, it shall not 
become effective until the appropriate legislative body has given 
its approval. Such wrong as may have occurred would have transpired 
if and when respondent submitted inaccurate information to the State 
Legislature in the course of.seeking legislative approval of the 
agreement. Assuming arguendo that the information submitted by the 
respondent to the State Legislature was inaccurate, a violation 
Dccurred on May 7, 19 74, and it ripened into the basis of the 
charge not later than August 14, 1974. 
NOW, THEREFORE, the charge herein should be, and hereby is, 
dismissed in its entirety. 
Dated: September 26, 1975 
Albany, New York 
'Robert D. by>/t Chairman 
Fred L. Denson 
iji 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
WILLIAMSVILLE CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Respondent, 
- and -
WILLIAMSVILLE TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party. 
#2C-9/26/75 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1255 
This matter comes before us on the exceptions of the Williamsville 
Teachers Association (charging party) to the decision of a hearing officer 
dismissing its charge on the ground that it had expressly agreed not to "reliti-
gate" the matter before PERB. The charge alleged that the Williamsville Central 
School District (respondent) had violated §209-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' 
1 
Fair Employment Act (Act) in refusing to grant contractually agreed upon 
sabbatical leaves to eight teachers. The charge was dismissed on respondent's 
motion and no hearing was held on the merits. 
In dismissing the charge, the hearing officer based his decision 
solely upon Section 3.18 of the agreement between the parties: 
"By submitting a grievance to arbitration, a grievant who is 
a teacher waives on his own behalf, and a grievant which is 
the Association waives on its own behalf and on behalf of all 
teachers affected by the grievance, every right, if any, which 
the grievant has or may have to pursue any other remedy before 
any hearing officer, tribunal, administrative agency or court 
with respect to the subject matter of the grievance." 
_1 This section of the Act makes it an improper employer practice to 
deliberately "(d) ...refuse to negotiate in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees." 
9P b' 
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In his decision, the hearing officer stated: 
"That the contractual condition precedent had been fully met 
when the charging party filed and prosecuted a grievance on 
this matter through arbitration." 
The hearing officer erred in this regard. 
We note that on May 2, 1974, the charging party commenced a class 
grievance in its name alleging a contract violation by the respondent in refusing 
to grant sabbatical leaves. The employer successfully challenged the arbitra-
bility of this grievance on the basis that the Association had no standing to 
bring the grievance in that it did not affect all, or substantially all, of the 
teachers in the bargaining unit. The arbitrator, however, gave the aggrieved 
teachers 10 days to bring individual grievances. These grievances were timely 
commenced and the merits of the matter were decided in a second arbitration 
proceeding in which the individuals were represented by the Association. 
While procedures such as those agreed upon in Section 3.18 are to be 
encouraged in that they foster employer-employee relations by minimizing the 
relitigation of issues in various fommg, nonetheless, express waiver provisions 
are to be closely scrutinized to insure that there has been no improper divest-
ment of statutory rights. It is noted that there was an attempt by the 
Association to submit the grievance to arbitration, but this attempt was defeated 
when the respondent successfully challenged arbitration of the matter. A 
determination that the first grievance brought by the Association was not arbi-
trable precluded arbitration of the matter and, as such, the matter was never 
submitted to arbitration. Thus, the condition precedent of Section 3.18 has not 
been fulfilled and the express waiver provision is not operable. Even though 
the Association represented the individuals in the second grievance, it was not, 
in fact, the grievant as required by Section 3.18. Thus, the Association is not 
barred from pursuing remedial measures based on an improper practice charge under 
the Act. 3965 
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Albeit that the express waiver provisions of Section 3.18 are not 
applicable, the arbitration of the matter based on the second grievance may have 
been dispositive of the issue that is the basis of the improper practice charge. 
Thus, we are hereby remanding the matter for the hearing officer to determine 
whether the award in the second arbitration proceeding satisfies the criteria set 
forth in our New York City Transit Authority decision (4 PERB 3669, 3670) and, if 
not, whether there is any merit to the charge. The standards in our New York 
City Transit Authority decision are: 
"...it (PERB) must be satisfied that the issues raised by the 
improper practice charge were fully litigated in the arbitra-
tion proceeding, that arbitral proceedings were not tainted 
by unfairness or serious procedural irregularities and that 
the determination of the arbitrator was not clearly repugnant 
to the purposes and policies of the Public Employees Fair 
Employment Act." 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that this matter be remanded to the hearing 
officer. 
Dated: September 26, 1975 
Albany, New York 
Robert D. Helsby, Onairman 
Fred L. Denson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2D-9/26/75 
In the Matter of 
QUEENS BOROUGH PUBLIC LIBRARY, 
Respondent, 
-and-
LOCAL 1321, DISTRICT COUNCIL 37, 
AMERICAN FEDERATION OF STATE, COUNTY, 
& MUNICIPAL EMPLOYEES, AFL-CIO, 
Charging Party. 
The Queens Borough Public Library (Library) issued a 
directive on April 24, 1974 rescinding a suppertime allowance that 
was a long-standing past practice. It had been referred to in its 
procedures manual since July 1, 1960 as follows: 
"A time allowance of 1/2 hour is made for 
the meal hour when on evening duty to all 
appointed members of the staff if the 
evening assignment is part of a regular 
work day." 
This unilateral action occurred while the Library and Local 1321, 
DC 37, AFSCME, AFL-CIO (charging party) were negotiating a successor 
contract to one covering the period from February 1, 1971 to 
August 31, 1973. This action by the Library precipitated the charge 
which alleged that the Library's unilateral action constituted a 
refusal to negotiate in good faith in violation of CSL §209-a.l(d). 
In 1970, the Library had elected to come under the 
provisions of the New York City Collective Bargaining Law (New York 
City Administrative Code Section 1173-1.0 et - seq.,;),. That Law 
provides for tiered bargaining. Although we have exclusive juris-
iiction over this charge (CSL §205.5(d)), the applicable substantive 
3967 
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provisions regarding the level at which a mandatory subject of 
negotiations must be negotiated are those of the New York City 
Law so long as they are substantially equivalent to the Taylor Law 
(CSL §212) . The employer must negotiate certain terms and conditior.s 
of employment with the unit representative. It may negotiate other 
terms and conditions of employment only on a departmental basis 
with an employee organization or group of employee organizations 
that is designated by the Board of Certification as being the 
representative of bargaining units which include more than 50 per-
cent of all employees in the department (Admin. Code Sec. 1173-4.3 
(3)). Still other terms and conditions of employment which must 
be uniform for all employees subject to the City's career and 
salary plan may be negotiated only on a citywide basis with an 
employee organization or group of employee organizations that is 
designated by the Board of Certification as being the representative: 
of bargaining units which include more than 50 percent of all 
employees in the career and salary plan (Admin. Code Sec. 1173-4.3 
(2)). 
In a case related to the instant one, New York City's 
Board of Collective Bargaining determined that the subject of 
suppertime allowances involved shift differentials and/or hours, 
and both matters are appropriate for negotiations at the citywide 
level (Matter of Queens Borough Public Library Decision No. B-12-17 
at p. 11). It qualified this conclusion by the observation that 
there could be unique circumstances on a department-wide or local 
level that would justify negotiations for an exception from the 
citywide agreement but found that no such issue was raised by the 
parties to their case, which includes the parties to this *&iM<SQ 
Board - U-12 34 3 
The implication of this is that the continuation of a suppertime 
allowance is a prohibited subject of negotiation between the 
Library and a union representing only Library employees, and that 
a contract between the Library and the charging party providing 
such a benefit would be void. However, it is not necessary for us 
to reach that question. In Matter of Administrative Board of the 
~Judlcial^Con'feren-ce~ of the State of "NewYork, 6'PERB 3032,~ we " ; ~ 
determined that the representation rights of an employee organiza-
tion might be restricted by the terms of its recognition or certi-
fication and that it might be denied the right to negotiate some 
terms and conditions of employment. For such an employee organi-
zation, those terms and conditions of employment would not be man-
datory subjects of negotiations. The charging party is so restric-
ted. For it, suppertime allowances is not a mandatory subject of 
negotiations. 
We have dealt with a similar problem in Matter of Board 
of Education of the City of New York, 5 PERB 3094. In that case, we 
held that a possible breach of contract involving a non-mandatory 
subject of negotiations raised no Taylor Law question under CSL 
§209-a.l(d), accord Allied Chemical and Alkali Workers Local 1 v. 
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Company, Chemical Division, 404 U.S. 157 
(1971). The charging party was thus left to its remedies for breach 
of agreement. Similarly, we now conclude that a public employer 
breaches no such duty to an employee organization by virtue of its 
changing a past practice involving a term and condition of employ-
ment over which it has no duty to negotiate with that organization. 
The above-cited decision of New York City's Board of Collective 
Bargaining directed the parties to arbitration. We assume that the 
3969 
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parties will comply with the direction of the Board of Collective 
Bargaining. This is not inconsistent with our decision in Matter 
of Board of Education of the City of New York. 
. • The hearing officer dismissed the charge herein and the 
Charging,.Party file_d exceptions. Those exceptions alleged errors of 
fact and law in that the hearing officer failed to apply our deci-
sion in Matter of Triborough Bridge and Tunnel Authority, 5 PERB 
3064, failed to distinguish between scope of bargaining and levels 
of bargaining under the New York City Collective Bargaining Law, 
and failed to conclude that the Library had an unlimited statutory 
obligation to negotiate with it notwithstanding its "limited 
election". Having reviewed the record, heard the parties' argu-
ments and read their briefs, we confirm the action of the hearing 
officer. 
NOW, THEREFORE, WE ORDER that the charge herein be, 
and hereby is, dismissed. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
September 26, 1975 
red L. "Denson 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
#2E-9/26/75 
In the Matter of 
COUNTY OF CATTARAUGUS, 
Respondent, 
-and-
CATTARAUSUS_COUNTY CHAPTER,_;. CIVIL 
SERVICE EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC., 
Charging Party. 
On June 27, 1974, the Cattaraugus County Chapter of 
the Civil Service Employees Association, Inc., (CSEA) filed an 
improper practice charge alleging that the County of Cattaraugus 
1 
(County) violated §2 09-a.l(d) of the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act (Act) when, on March 26, 1974, it unilaterally dis-
continued providing county-owned cars to six Health Department 
employees who had theretofore enjoyed the use of such cars for 
travel within the scope of their employment and for driving to and 
from work. 
The hearing officer found a violation in that the 
County unlawfully discontinued its practice of providing cars to 
employees. The County filed the following exceptions to the hearinc-
officer's decision and recommended order. 
1 This section makes it an improper employer practice deliberately 
to refuse to negotiate collectively in good faith with the duly 
recognized or certified representatives of its public employees. 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. U-1206 
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EXCEPTIONS: 
1. The affirmative defense of laches is a meritorious one 
and the hearing officer was in error in failing to give effect 
thereto, and further a finding of a violation of respondent's duty 
to negotiate cannot be sustained in the absence of a finding that 
the employee organization requested negotiations. 
2. The -grant of- affirmative relief- -in the hear-i-ngofficerjs 
recommended order that the respondent "shall forthwith return the 
cars to the affected employees" is beyond the power of this Board 
to grant. 
Exception based on defense of laches 
The assertion of the defense of laches presents an initial 
problem. Such a defense in our system of jurisprudence is asserted 
traditionally as a defense to the grant of equitable relief such as 
injunction or specific performance and is not generally regarded as 
a defense to an action at law. The essential difference being that 
in the former, i.e., equitable relief, the grant of relief is not 
absolute, but discretionary, whereas in the latter the right to 
relief, once the right is established, is an absolute right. 
The Rules of this Board in prescribing the time within whict 
to file an improper practice charge provides that the charge be 
2 
filed within four months. The Rules of this Board and the decisions 
of this Board have not, to date, given effect to the doctrine of 
laches. Thus, we will treat the defense of laches as one asserting 
2 §204.1(a). 
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that the charge herein was not timely filed. 
This requires a review of the facts established in the 
record. 
1. The County Legislature passed a resolution on July 11, 
19 73 for the sale of the 14 cars in the Health Department, and to 
be replaced by the purchase of only 8 cars. 
2. Pursuant to "Article VIII §3 of the agreement"Between 
the County and CSEA, a copy of the agenda of the legislature is to 
be sent to the president of CSEA chapter. Baker, County Clerk and 
chief negotiator for County, testified (p. 207) that a copy of the 
above resolution was sent to CSEA. Later, on cross-examination, 
he testified he had no specific record of sending the July 11, 19 73 
resolution, but relied upon general practice that it was sent 
(p. 223). The field representative of CSEA said he did not learn 
of the change until May 1974 (p. 140). 
3. Baker testified no one from CSEA approached him on the 
issue of cars until the spring of 19 74. 
4. On October 16, 1973, the Health Commissioner, Dr. Moss, 
wrote to the six nurses (to be deprived of cars) that "around 
December 1, 19 73" the County would no longer supply cars to them. 
He wrote, "I made numerous efforts to maintain the car...but my 
efforts were of no avail," and further, "the final decision has 
been made". The decision of the legislature on July 11, 1973, "does 
not leave me any other choice". 
5. All the nurses who testified said, in substance, that 
when the letter of October 16, 19 73 was received, they did not 
Board - U-1206 -4 
believe it would actually happen because of rumors in prior years 
that the cars would be taken away and they were not. They admitted, 
however, there was never legislative action before and that they hacjl 
never received such a letter before. 
6. One nurse discussed the October 16th letter with her 
supervisor, who said the Commissioner could do nothing about it 
"(p. 56) . Another nurse"' (p.80T spoke to the CoirSnissioner" in 
November or December and he said that he would do everything to kee$ 
the cars. The Director of Nursing also spoke to the Commissioner. 
She testified he said that he would go back to take care of it as 
he had done in the past. Nothing was heard from the Commissioner 
through December — February (pp. 118-120). 
7. No one of the nurses spoke to CSEA representatives after 
receiving the October 16th letter. The first time the Director of 
Nursing took it up with a representative of CSEA was when the car 
was taken away in March 1974 (p. 121). 
8. The CSEA field representative said he first heard of t 
the car issue in May 19 74 (p. 140). The field representative spoke 
with Baker and agreed not to file any charge until Baker reported 
back to him. In June, Baker reported that the legislature was 
adamant (pp. 147-8). 
9. Dr. Moss testified that when the nurses spoke to him 
about the car issue, he said that they should take it up with the 
union, but on cross-examination he could not identify the persons 
so advised. He did testify that he did go back to speak to the 
authorities, including a legislator, several times (pp. 178, 181, 
189, 193). 
Board - U-1206 5 
On the above facts in the record, it cannot be controverted 
that the affected employees knew in October 19 73 that the employer, 
through the legislature, had resolved to withdraw the subject cars. 
However, this fact does not warrant the conclusion that the time 
within which to file a charge commenced in October. The charging 
party, CSEA, is the negotiating agent for the affected employers. 
"Thus, when a change in termsandconditions of employment is con-
templated, the employer, in discharge of its obligation, must give 
notice to the certified or recognized representative of its 
employees. This obligation is not discharged by giving notice to 
the individual employees affected. An employer should deal with its 
employees through their representative and not deal with the repre-
3 
sentative through the employees. Therefore, the time to file a 
charge herein commenced when the representative had, or should have 
had, notice, or was otherwise aware of the employer's decision to 
4 
change terms or conditions of employment. Here, the representative 
was not aware of the employer's action until, at the earliest, March 
of:T9 74; and since the charge was filed in June 19 74, it was within 
5 
the four-month period and thus timely filed. The part of the 
employer's exception to the effect that a violation of a duty to 
negotiate in good faith does not arise until the employee organi-
se Cf. NLRB v. General Electric, 418 F2d 736, 759. 
4_ Gf. In the Matter of City of White Plains, 7 PERB 4557. 
5_ Thus, even if the defense of. laches were available, it would not 
be properly invoked due to lack of notice to the charging party. 
3975 
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zation makes a request to negotiate and such request is denied has 
no application here because the charge is grounded on a unilateral 
change in terms and conditions of employment and not upon a denial 
of a demand to negotiate. 
Exception as to scope of the recommended order 
This exception is meritorious in the light of the decision 
of the Court of Appeals in the Matter of Jefferson County, """" """ 
NY 2d (19 75), and the order herein is modified so as to be in 
accord with such decision. 
Therefore, in view of the above findings of fact, conclu-
sions of law, and the specific violation we have found, 
WE ORDER that the County negotiate in good faith. 
Dated: September 26, 1975 
Albany, New York 
cf Matter of Rensselaer County, 8 PERB 3064. 
STATE OF NEW YORK _ 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS ARD 
= #2F-9 /26 /75 
I n t h e M a t t e r o f 
PENFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL D I S T R I C T , 
E m p l o y e r , 
- a n d - CASE NO. C - 1 2 34 
B E N T E ^ F S C M E , LOCAL 2 4 1 9 - A , NEW YORK COUNCIL 6 6 , 
. AFSCME, A F L - C I O , ' : 
P e t i t i o n e r . : 
• BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
7 • " • • • 
On May 2, 1975, BENTE/AFSCME,•Local 2419-A, New York Council 66, 
AFSCME, AFL-CIO (petitioner) filed, in accordance with the Rules of 
Procedure of the New York- State Public Employment Relations Board, a 
timely petition for certification as the exclusive negotiating repre-
sentative of certain employees employed by the Penfield Central School 
District. Thereafter; the parties entered into a consent agreement, 
in which they stipulated to the following.as the appropriate negotiating 
unit: \ • •• • 7 
Included: Food service helper, bus driver, bus mechanic, 
general mechanic (maintenance), custodian, 
) groundskeeper, cleaner (matron). 
Excluded: All other employees of the employer (seasonal
 N 
and substitute). 
The consent agreement was approved by the Director of Public Employment. 
Practices and Representation on June 6, 1975. 
Pursuant to the consent agreement, a. secret ballot election, was 
held on June 16, 1975. The results of this election indicate that a 
majority of the eligible voters in the stipulated unit who cast ballots 
do hot desire to be represented for purposes o.f collective negotiations 
1] < . • 
by the petitioner. 
1] Of the 127 employees participating in the election, 47 voted in 
favor of representation by the petitioner, 78 voted against and 
2 ballots were ehaJilenged. 
Following the election, the petitioner filed objections to conduct 
allegedly affecting the results of the election; however, the 
Director overruled the objections in their entirety (8 PERB 4076 
[1975]) .angLno .appeal"was. taken from his decision. Q Q 1 ^ ^ ' 
-2- , . 
THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the petition should be, and hereby 
is, dismissed. 
Dated: Albany, New York 
September 2 §,1975 
ROBERT D. HELSBY/' Chairman 
/M/Jm--/i\ -^-Am&mz*-
CpSEPH R. CROWLEY 
/ 
FRED L . DENSON 
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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
IN THE MATTER OF 
PENFIELD CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer, 
-and-
j BENTE/AFSCME, LOCAL 2419-A, NEWYORK 
:! COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
•i • ' 
!! 
II Pet i t ioner. 
#2F-9/26/75 
Case No. ,-._•]
 ?^/|. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and'it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that BENTE/AFSCME, LOCAL 2419-A,' 
NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
has been designated and selected by a majority of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: Included: head custodian, head painter, head groundsman, 
head auto mechanic, cook managers, head mainten-
ance mechanic. 
Excluded: all other employees of the employer. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
; shall negotiate collectively with BENTE/AFSCME, LOCAL 2419-A, 
.NEW YORK COUNCIL 66, AFSCME, AFL-CIO, 
jjand enter into a written agreement with such employee organization 
'•with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the. 
/determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
•Signed on the 26 day of September 19 75-
PERB 58(2-68) FRED L.. DENSON 
D. ^ 7 8 A L 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
SUFFOLK COUNTY OFF-TRACK BETTING 
CORPORATION, 
Employe r , 
-and-
#2G-9/26/75 
Case No. C-127? 
LOCAL 237, INTERNATIONAL BROTHERHOOD OF 
TEAMSTERS, • 
Petitioner. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the 
above matter by the Public Employment Relations Board in accord-
ance with the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act and the 
Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected; 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the 
Public Employees' Fair Employment Act, 
IT IS. HEREBY CERTIFIED that Local 237, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters , • . ' 
has been designated and .selected by a majority^of the employees 
of the above named public employer, in the unit described below, 
as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Unit: 
Included: All full-time and part-time•cashiers, 
attendants, custodians and telephone 
operators. 
Excluded: All other employees. 
Further, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer 
shall negotiate collectively with Local 237, International 
Brotherhood of Teamsters 
and enter'into a written agreement with such employee organization 
with regard to terms and conditions of employment, and shall 
negotiate collectively with such employee organization in the 
determination of, and administration of, grievances. 
Signed on the 26th day of September 19 75. 
PERB 58( 
ROBERT D."HELSBY/ Chairman 
'eewz&f 
2-68) FRED L. DENSON 
•<t*J I *j 
